Co-Chairs' streamlining of the
First iteration of a draft decision text
on

CMA 6 agenda item 11(a)
New collective quantified goal on climate finance

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[*The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement*,

Recalling Articles 3, 4, 9 and 11 of the Convention,

Recalling Articles 2, 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement,

Recalling Article 2, paragraph 1(c), and Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement,

Recalling Article 4 of the Convention, paragraphs 53 of decision 1 CP/21, and Articles 2 and 9 of the Paris Agreement, highlighting the need to take into account the priorities and needs of developing countries,

Recalling 2/CP.15, paragraph 8, in which, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries and confirmed that this funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance,

Recalling decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53, in which Parties decided that, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries,

Recalling decision 14/CMA.1, which decided to, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, to initiate deliberations on setting a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, and agreed to consider, in its deliberations the aim to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development,

Recalling decisions 9/CMA.4 and 8/CMA.5,

Noting decisions 2/CMA.5 and 1/CMA.5,

Further recalling decisions 14/CMA.1, 9/CMA.3, 5/CMA.4, 1/CMA.5 and 8/CMA.5,

1. Option 1: *Confirms* that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance aims at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and will [support][address] implementation of current nationally determined contributions national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, including those submitted as adaptation components of nationally determined contributions, increase and accelerate ambition, and reflect the evolving needs of developing country Parties, and the need for enhanced provision and mobilization of climate finance from a wide variety of sources and instruments and channels;

Option 2: *Recalls* the outcomes of the first global stocktake and *reaffirms* the commitments to accelerate action in this critical decade to hold the global average temperature well below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ℃ above pre-industrial levels, on the basis of best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty{, the principle of historical responsibility, and the right to development and just transitions};

{*Reaffirms* the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

Decides to establish a new collective quantified goal on climate finance which aims to contribute to the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, including holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change, increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions, development, in a manner that does not threaten food production, and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development};

Option 3*: {Affirms}{ Reiterates/Resolves}* that the new collective quantified goal aims at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement{, including}{of} holding the increase in the global average temperature {to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature} increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development;

Option 4: *Decides* that the new collective quantified goal aims at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, underscoring that impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5C compared to well below 2C, resolving to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C and emphasising the need for urgent action and support to keep the 1.5C goal within reach and to address the climate crisis in this critical decade;

aOption 5*: Decides* that the NCQG aims at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and will support the implementation of developing country parties' current NDCs, NAPs and adaptation communications, including those submitted as adaptation components of NDCs, enable an increase in ambition, and the need for enhanced provision and mobilisation of climate finance from developed country Parties;

Option 6: *Decides* that the purpose of the new collective quantified goal is to be delivered entirely to all developing country Parties to contribute to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change in developing countries; increasing their ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development, in continuation of developed country Parties obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

Highlights that the new collective quantified goal shall contribute to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 by providing and mobilizing resources that enable all developing countries to meet their climate goals by enhancing their adaptive capacities and transitioning to a low-carbon economy. All of this within the context of sustainable development, efforts to eradicate poverty, and just transitions;

Decides that the resources provided and mobilized through the new goal shall be ambition responsive and support the current and future level of ambition of developing country Parties expressed in planning instruments, inter alia, the National Determined Contributions, Long-term strategies, National Adaptation Plans, Technology Action Plans;

2. *Notes* the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, including the urgency of climate action {and scale-up of finance needed, that both adaptation and mitigation financing}{, that finance, technology, and international cooperation are critical enablers for accelerated climate action, that if climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing} would need to increase manyfold[,] [and] that there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gap but there are barriers to redirecting capital to climate action, and that Governments through public funding and clear signals to investors are key in reducing these barriers{, and investors, central banks and financial regulators can also play their part};

3. Option 1: *Highlights* that costed needs in nationally determined contributions are estimated at [USD 5.036–6.876 trillion][USD 5.012–6.852 trillion up until 2030][455–584 billion per year] according to the second report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement by the Standing Committee on Finance, noting {that the report does not fully cover the needs and costs of developing countries and all regions as a result of limited availability of information}{significant gaps and limitations due to gaps in information on the processes and approaches used in determining needs, the methodologies and underlying assumptions used, and a lack of available data, tools, capacities};

Option 2: *Highlights* that the financial needs of developing country Parties are currently estimated at USD 5.0–6.8 trillion for the pre-2030 period, and adaptation finance needs are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030; acknowledging that these needs estimations are likely undervalued as not all needs have been expressed in monetary values;

Option 3: *Highlights* the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties and the support provided and mobilised, including the adaptation finance gap, highlighting that such needs are currently estimated at USD 5.8–5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period for Nationally Determined Contributions and the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030;

Option 4: *Highlights* the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties and the current investment flows and support provided and mobilized, including the adaptation finance gap, and on responding to loss and damage;

Option 5: *Recalls* Decision 1/CMA.5, paragraph 67, which highlights the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular those due to the increasing impacts of climate change compounded by difficult macroeconomic circumstances, and the support provided and mobilized for their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions;

Further recalls Decision 1/CMA.5, paragraph 68, which also highlights that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030; noting with concern that the adaptation finance gap is widening and that current levels of climate finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building for adaptation remain insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

4. *Confirms* that the scale and elements of the goal should reflect the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries, as a dynamic process;

5. *Decides* that the NCQG will be delivered in the context of the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties, for mitigation and adaptation and addressing loss and damage;

6. *Recognizes* the evolving nature of needs and capabilities and the need for the new collective quantified goal to be aligned with current global economic realities and *acknowledges* that countries have different capabilities and national circumstances, and that these capabilities and national circumstances evolve over time, including their capacity to

contribute to global efforts to address the threat of climate change and to partner with and mobilise support for implementation of climate action in developing countries;

7. *Recognizes* the urgent need to support the implementation of nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans, and long-term strategies, including capacity building and technology transfer;

8. *Recalls* that about USD 4 trillion per year needs to be invested in renewable energy up until 2030 to be able to reach net zero emissions by 2050, and that, furthermore, a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investment of at least USD 4–6 trillion per year;

9. *Notes* that the Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows found that global climate finance flows in 2021-2022 increased by 63 percent compared with those in 2019-2020, reaching an annual average of USD 1.3 trillion;

10. Option 1: *Recognizes* that {near-term action,}{financial} support {and investment in meaningful} {for} mitigation activities {are}{is} crucial to minimizing the severity of {climate-related hazards}{the adverse effects of climate change}, and {consequently} to the need for and cost of addressing them, including through adaptation and disaster preparedness and responding to loss and damage;

Option 2: *Recognise* that action for mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction and response exist on a continuum and should be planned for in an integrated and holistic manner, *emphasises* the key role of disaster risk reduction and response finance for all affected by climate change, especially the most vulnerable;

11. *Underscores* the urgent need to scale up mitigation and adaptation finance for developing countries and that inaction in both will lead to higher financing needs related to loss and damage;

12. *Recognizes* the crucial synergies and interdependencies between finance for climate, biodiversity, land degradation and the sustainable development goals, and *resolves* to enhance and foster such synergies with a view to gain co-benefits;

13. Option 1: *Recognizes* that achieving ambitious goals requires a significant scaling up of finance flows, structural transformation of domestic and global economies and financial markets, and clear investment strategies supported by domestic resource mobilization and mainstreaming of climate considerations into policy, regulatory and fiscal planning];

Option 2: *Recognises* that achieving ambitious goals requires a significant scaling up of climate finance provided and mobilized by developed country Parties;

14. *Affirms* that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States{, with a view to providing an equitable distribution to all in developing country geographical regions in accordance with their special circumstances};

15. *Emphasises* that realising the levels of investment necessary to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement will require global economic transformation, and recognises that this can only be enabled through sustained action by all Parties and relevant actors, public, private and other, to align domestic and international financial markets, including through the establishment of ambitious climate policies and investment strategies, backed by domestic resource allocation and international cooperation and partnership;

16. *Acknowledges* the need for a global effort to enhance and align public and private finance and to mobilise finance at scale from all sources - public and private, domestic and international, including new and innovative sources of finance, affirming that the new collective quantified goal will seek to engage all possible sources of finance to support its ultimate goal;

17. *Notes* the outcomes of the first global stocktake underscoring the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and resolving to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C;

Decides that finance towards the NCQG should be compatible with the aim described in paragraph [X];

Highlights that the necessary rapid and sustained reductions to achieve the aim outlined in paragraph [X] require both urgently and significantly scaling up climate finance that is consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and scaling down finance that runs counter to aim described in paragraph X;

Notes that to achieve the aim described in paragraph [X], Parties should transition climate finance towards the clean energy transition and away from [fossil fuels] [emissions intensive investments], supporting efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science;

Agrees that to achieve the aim described in paragraph [X], the provision of finance invested in energy accounted for under the New Collective Quantified Goal should solely include finance which supports the clean energy transition and the transition away from fossil fuel finance;

18. *Stresses* that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and that developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, noting the significant role of public funds, supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties including in addressing loss and damage;

19. Option 1*: Acknowledges* the existing barriers and ongoing challenges faced by developing country Parties in accessing climate finance {, emphasises the importance of addressing these to enable greater climate ambition}{in accessing climate finance and by finance providers in working in challenging operating environments} [and *recognizes* that developing country Parties have increased ambition despite the financing gap and barriers and challenges faced];

Option 2: *Recognises* the challenges experienced by developing countries in accessing climate finance, including the particular constraints faced by LDCs and SIDS; *welcomes* ongoing efforts by all climate finance providers to improve access, and *further recognizes* the risks and consequences associated with delayed or inequitable access;

Option 3: *Acknowledge* the challenges and special needs of LDCs and SIDS, regarding the provision and mobilisation of climate finance, including access;

20. *Acknowledges* that developing countries suffer the disproportionate impacts of climate change amidst multiple developments facing a high cost of capital for climate financing, currency risks, which collectively elevate perceived investment risks, and that significant existing debt burdens further constrain their borrowing capacity and escalating interest rates, impeding finance to flow to their countries;

21. *Recognizes* that developing country Parties have increased ambition over the years despite the disproportionate gap in the provision and mobilization of finance from developed country Parties and further recognizes the importance of the support provided and mobilized by developed country Parties to facilitate enhanced ambition and implementation;

22. *Emphasize* the need for further efforts to enhance access to climate finance, including through harmonized, simplified and direct access procedures, as well as building capacity, to address the needs of developing country Parties, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing States;

23. *Acknowledge* the fiscal constraints and increasing costs to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change and, in this context, *reiterates* the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation in developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable and have significant capacity constraints, such as in the least developed countries and small island developing States;

24. *Decides* that the New Collective Quantified Goal must be delivered in a manner that reflects the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances; the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries in particular loss and damage; the historical responsibility of Annex II Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the right to development, sustainable development, efforts to eradicate poverty and just transitions;

25. *Decides* that the New Collective Quantified Goal must be delivered in a manner that reflect the principles of fairness, equity and justice must be up held when considering the new goal and its delivery;

26. *Recognises* the importance of just transitions, resilience building, the promotion of sustainable development, food security and the eradication of poverty in developing countries;

27. *Stresses* that the delivery of the NCQG should be based on the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities, that climate action is to be implemented in the context of sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, climate justice, just transitions, country-drivenness, predictability, affordability, accessibility, effectiveness, progression, urgency to support climate ambition, implementation and action, regional balance, fairness;

28. *Decides* the New Collective Quantified Goal and its principles should be human rights-based and gender- and children and youth-responsive and consider the people and communities on the frontlines of climate change, including women, youth, children, workers, and Indigenous Peoples, as well as civil society, in recognition of their important roles in preventing, addressing and responding to climate change;

29. *Acknowledges* that climate finance must be delivered in a context that respects human-rights, the rights on Indigenous People and local communities, the rights of children and youth and gender and race equality;

30. *Decides* that the implementation of the new collective quantified goal recognizes the importance of human rights, gender, children's rights, and the rights of Indigenous Peoples;

31. *Underscores* that climate finance must respect, protect, promote and fulfill human rights by being human rights-based and consider the people and communities on the front lines of climate change, including women and girls, children, youth, indigenous peoples as well as civil society, in recognition of their important roles in addressing and responding to climate change;

32. *Reaffirms* that the New Collective Quantified Goal, its principles and parameters must respect, promote and consider human rights, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, the rights of women and girls, in all their diversity, gender equality, intergenerational equity and the rights of children, and the rights of people with disabilities;

33. *Underscores* the need to respect, promote and consider the rights, needs and priorities of Indigenous People who are often at the frontlines of climate change and key actors of change and underscores the importance of building climate action on the best available science as well as traditional, local and indigenous knowledge and practices,

acknowledging the role and contributions of Indigenous Peoples and of local communities in nature stewardship and climate leadership as well as the disproportionate effects of climate change on Indigenous Peoples and local communities;

34. *Recognizes* the important roles of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge in addressing and responding to climate change impacts, and encourages support for the ethical and equitable engagement and use of the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples in the design and delivery of climate finance;

35. *Affirms* the rights of Indigenous Peoples [included in the context of other rights based language];

36. *Recognises and respect*s the rights, needs and priorities of Indigenous Peoples and underscore the importance of building climate action on the best available science as well as drawing on traditional, local and Indigenous knowledge and practices, and supporting climate financing and investment strategies which are responsive to and developed in meaningful consultation with, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities;

37. *Acknowledges* that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that Parties should{, when taking action to finance and address climate change,} respect, promote and consider {their respective obligations on} human rights{, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, refugees, workers, children, and the right to development, as well as gender equality,} and the rights of women and girls, { intergenerational equity,} persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations {and ensure finance for climate change action is responsive to and takes into account Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, refugees, workers, youth and children, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women}{and recognition of the roles of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge in addressing and responding to climate change and recognition of using their knowledge in the design and delivery of climate finance};

38. *Emphasizes* the importance of mainstreaming gender equality and equity in climate finance, notably taking into account intersectionality considerations, with the aim of making all climate finance flows gender transformative;

39. *Affirms* that financing for climate action must take into account the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children, including through measures which meaningfully empower youth and children as agents of change;

40. *Acknowledges* that addressing climate change should not hamper economic development but drive it, and that specific needs of post conflict areas must be met sustainably and in a way that aligns with 1.5° C goal;

41. *Affirms* the importance of meaningful and effective social dialogue and broad stakeholder engagement when delivering climate finance, including with communities vulnerable to climate impacts, including women and girls, children, youth, Indigenous Peoples, workers, as well as civil society, as important enablers of effective, inclusive and participatory just and low emissions transition pathways and transformational adaptation action;

42. *Underscores* the importance of just transition pathways to net zero and climate resilient societies as an opportunity for enhancing social development and economic growth in all countries encouraging governments to undertake meaningful social dialogue with workers and communities, with the aim of integrating consideration of just transition pathways into national policy frameworks, enabling environments, finance and investment strategies in an inclusive manner, leaving no one behind;

43. *Reiterates* the need to accelerate implementation of GST-outcomes, nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans and communications, including those submitted as adaptation components of nationally determined contributions, and affirming that these should be backed by clear investment strategies, domestic resource mobilization and supporting economic, monetary, macro, financial, fiscal and other policies;

44. *Also notes* that the Sixth Biennial Assessment found that global fossil fuel investments averaged USD 958 billion per year in 2021-2022, and that fossil fuel subsidies averaged USD 1.1 trillion per year in 2021-2022;

45. *Recognizes* the crucial synergies and interdependencies between finance for climate, biodiversity, land degradation and the sustainable development goals, and *resolves* to enhance and foster such synergies with a view to gain co-benefits;

46. *Recognise* that action for mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction and response exist on a continuum and should be planned for in an integrated and holistic manner, *emphasises* the key role of disaster risk reduction and response finance for all affected by climate change, especially the most vulnerable;

47. Option 1: *{Recognises}{Welcomes with appreciation}{Acknowledges}* that the goal of collectively mobilising USD 100 billion goal for developing countries by 2020 and through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation was not achieved in 2020 or 2021, but met and {{significantly} exceeded in 2022, when USD 115.9 billion was collectively mobilised}{welcomes that the goal was materially surpassed in 2022, with developed countries mobilising USD 115.9 billion, exceeding the annual goal by USD 15.9 billion};

Option 2: *Notes* with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilise jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not been met, and *decides* that developed country Parties shall mobilise the arrears of the USD 100 billion annual goal by no later than 31 December 2025;

48. *Confirms* that the USD 100 billon commitment of developed country Parties is meant to be delivered on an annual basis from 2020 through to 2025 and acknowledges that there is consensus that the goal has not been met in 2020 and 2021;

49. *Recognizes* that estimations on the delivery of the goal in 2022 differ due to different accounting methodologies and definitions and acknowledges the need for consistency and comparability of the data provided by developed country Parties;

50. Option 1: *Notes* the lessons learned from the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, including the need for a common understanding of progress, striking a balance in climate finance between mitigation and adaptation, financial instruments and prioritization of the least developed countries and small island developing States;

Option 2: *Notes* the lessons learned from the goal of developed country Parties to mobilise jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, including the importance of reflecting the needs and priorities of developing countries in terms of quantum and quality of finance, a common understanding of progress, ensuring high-quality funding with a balance in climate finance between mitigation and adaptation, and reaffirming the responsibility and obligations of developed countries to contribute public finance, especially for those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS);

Option 3: *Notes* the lessons learned from the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, including the key role of reforms to enabling environments, the importance of reducing market-distortions from inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, the need for a common understanding of progress, striking a balance in climate finance between mitigation and adaptation, the wide variety of financial instruments that are necessary to enable climate action, the importance of incentivizing private sector engagement and funding, the essentiality of maximum participation by all Parties with the capacity to contribute, and the need to continue to prioritize investment in LDCs and SIDS;

Option 4: Notes that the NCQG builds on the lessons learned from the USD 100 billion per year goal which includes, inter alia, the need for affordable finance that is non-debt inductive, clarity on the criteria to measuring financial flows, the need to urgently and substantially scale-up adaptation finance for all developing countries, the need to provide finance through instruments that free-up fiscal space and contribute to reduce cost of capital for climate action in line with the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries;

51. *Requests* the secretariat to review data from Biennial Reports and other relevant reports within the UNFCCC, with a view to providing independent assessments of the delivery of the USD 100 billion from 2020-2022 and issue a finding report by CMA.7, taking into account the following requirements:

(a) The aggregation of flows shall only account for grant or grant-equivalent elements of support, non-concessional loans even on more preferential terms cannot count towards progress;

(b) The activities shall align with activities identified in national plans, strategies and policies of developing country Parties to prioritize country-ownership and recognize developing countries' role in determining their own priorities;

52. *{Calls for}{Decides* that} developed country Parties {shall mobilize}{to deliver} the arrears of the USD 100 billion {as identified in 2028 in the report of this decision by no later than 31, December 2030;

Developed country Parties shall mobilize the arrears of the USD 100 billion and report on progress in doing so with third-party verification and assurance separately from their delivery of the New Collective Quantified Goal;}

Option 1: provision and mobilization goal

53. *Acknowledges* that, aligned with Article 4 of the Convention and Article 9.1 and 9.3 of the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53, and in line with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the new collective quantified goal is the sole obligation of developed countries to provide and mobilize climate finance to developing countries and must accurately reflect the establishment of operational features to give full effect to Article 9.4 and 9.9 of the Paris Agreement in line with the needs and priorities of developing countries;

54. Sub-option 1:

Decides to set an new collective quantified goal on climate finance [of USD X][from a floor of USD 100 billion][of at least USD 1 trillion][of USD 1.1 trillion][of at least USD 1.3 trillion][of USD 2 trillion] per year [in grant-equivalent terms] [from 2025 to 2029][from 2025 to 2030][from 2025 to 2035][from 2026 to 2035][by 2030] provided and mobilized by developed country Parties and to address the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties with a significant provision component for adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage;

Also decides that developed country Parties provide [USD X][at least USD 441 billion] per year [in grant-equivalent terms] [to support the achievement of][in addition to] the mobilization goal referred to in paragraph X above;

Urges developed country Parties to establish burden-sharing arrangements [based on historical emissions] in the delivery of the goal outlined in paragraph X above;

55. [*Decides* that Parties that provide and mobilize climate finance to developing country Parties through bilateral and multilateral channels contribute to achieving the goal][*Urges* developed country Parties and *encourages* other Parties with developed country Parties taking the lead, as part of a global effort];

Sub-option 2:

Decides to set a goal of USD 1.3 trillion per year until 2030 provided and mobilized by developed country Parties to address the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties and encourages other parties in a position to contribute to do so;

Also decides that developed country Parties provide at least USD 600 billion per year in grant-equivalent terms to support the achievement the mobilization goal referred to in paragraph X above;

Decides to establish burden-sharing arrangements for developed country Parties based on historical emissions and GDP per capita in the delivery of the goal outlined in paragraphs above;

Sub-option 3:

Decides to set an NCQG of at least USD 1.3 trillion per year from grants and highly concessional instruments from 2025 up to 2030 to be provided and mobilised by developed country Parties to address the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties;

Further decides that the developed country Parties shall establish burden-sharing arrangements to enable the delivery of the goal outlined in paragraph X above;

Sub-Option 4:

Decides that developed country Parties shall provide jointly at least USD X trillion in grant-equivalent terms of new, additional, predictable and adequate climate finance per year to address the current and evolving priorities and needs of all developing country Parties in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and this decision, hereinafter referred to as "the provision goal"; and *further decides* that within this provision goal there shall be respective minimum allocation floors for the least developed countries and small island developing States of at least USD 220 billion for LDCs and at least USD 39 billion for SIDS in grant-equivalent terms per year;

Decides that aforementioned floors shall be implemented jointly by all channels in a manner that ensures:

(a) safeguarding against the overconcentration of support in any given country or sub-region in these groups;

(b) thematic prioritisation for access to: grant and highly concessional finance for adaptation, primarily grant finance for loss and damage response, and solely grant finance for long-term readiness support, and transparency support;

(c) increased support for programmatic, country-driven climate responses;

(d) minimum financial terms and conditions for non-grant instruments for all countries in these groups that are at least: 1% or below for interest rate with the aforementioned interest rate being fixed; 5 years or above for grace periods with the aforementioned grace period from the time of first drawdown; 30 years or above for maturity periods; 1.5% or below for any service, administrative or commitment charge; and mandatory inclusion of climate resilience debt clauses on debt reduction in the financial agreement based on a no-objection approval by the Party concerned;

(e) adequate tracking of the achievement of these minimum allocations;

Further decides that in addition to the goal set out in paragraph X above, developed country Parties shall take the lead by mobilising at least USD X[1] billion through their public interventions per year, to address the current and evolving priorities and needs of developing country Parties in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and this decision, hereafter referred to as "the mobilisation goal";

Decides the collective quantified goal on climate finance shall be at least the sum of the provision goal and the mobilisation goal per year, hereinafter referred to as "the goal";

Sub-option 5:

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[1] For example, this mobilisation through public interventions component would be an additional USD 260 billion on top of a USD 1.5 trillion provision component. The sum of the two components would be the collective quantified goal.

Decides that developed country Parties shall provide jointly at least USD 1.3 trillion in grant-equivalent terms of new, additional, predictable and adequate climate finance per year to address the current and evolving priorities and needs of all developing country Parties in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, hereinafter referred to as “the provision goal”; and further decides that within this provision goal there shall be respective minimum allocation floors for the least developed countries and small island developing States of the provision of at least USD 220 billion for LDCs and at least USD XX billion for SIDS in grant-equivalent terms per year;

Further decides that the aforementioned floors shall be implemented jointly by all channels in a manner that ensures:

(a) Thematic prioritisation for access to grant and highly concessional finance for adaptation, primarily grant finance for loss and damage response, and solely long-term readiness support, and transparency support;

(b) Increased support for programmatic, country-driven climate responses;

(c) Minimum financial terms and conditions for non-grant instruments for all countries in these groups that are at least: 1% or below for interest rate with the aforementioned interest rate being fixed; 5 years or above for grace periods with the aforementioned grace period from the time of first drawdown; 30 years or above for maturity periods; 1.5% or below for any service, administrative or commitment charge; and mandatory inclusion of climate resilience debt clauses on debt reduction for debt pauses and debt reduction, without increases in the cost of capital, including in the International Monetary Fund in financial agreement based on a no-objection approval by the Party concerned;

(d) Adequate tracking of the achievement of these minimum allocations;

Decides that in addition to the goal set out in paragraph X above, developed country Parties shall take the lead in mobilising at least USD X billion in grant equivalent terms through their public interventions per year, to address the current and evolving priorities and needs of developing country Parties in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and this decision, hereafter referred to as “the mobilisation goal”;

Decides that the collective quantified goal on climate finance shall be at least the sum of the provision goal and the mobilisation goal per year, hereinafter referred to as “the goal”;

Sub-option 6:

Decides to establish a New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance of at least USD 1.3 trillion of dollars annually, from 2026-2035, from developed to all developing countries, in grants or grant-equivalent terms of new, additional, affordable, predictable, non-debt inducing and adequate climate finance, for adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage, to support developing country Parties, in a country-driven manner, in the implementation of their National Determined Contributions, Long-term strategies, National Adaptation Plans, Climate Finance Strategies, Technology Action Plans, among others instruments;

Further decides that the NCQG has one provision and one mobilization component;

Decides that in the provision component, developed country Parties will provide a significant amount of public resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and other mechanisms and constituted bodies within the UNFCCC;

Decides that developed country Parties shall institute fair, just, and equitable burden-sharing arrangements in the delivery of the provision goal based on their equitable share of historical emissions of greenhouse gases;

56. *Further decides* that other countries in a position to do so may contribute voluntarily in accordance with Article 9.2 of the Paris Agreement;

57. *Further decides* that, once a significant provision target is set, Parties may advance on the definition of a mobilization target, which should not include domestic resources;

Option 2: multi-layered approach, including investment, provision and mobilization

58. *Recalls* that in relevant deliberations at COP 21, the key issue under discussion was who would contribute to an extension of the USD 100 billion goal referred to in decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8;

59. *Agrees* that the new collective quantified goal is to be set in accordance with Article 9.3.;

60.

Sub-option 1:

Establishes a goal of investing USD [X] trillion globally in climate action by 2035 from all sources, public and private, domestic and international, in all Parties, and in furtherance of this goal:

(a) Welcomes the intention of [the Parties in a position to contribute][all capable Parties] to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD [100+] billion per year for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries by 2035 in the context of pursuing efforts to limit global temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, building global resilience, and all Parties transparently on their implementation;

(b) [Placeholder – qualitative elements, as below];

Notes that contributions to the goal described in paragraph [X] are without prejudice to any Party's development status or ability to receive climate finance support;

Sub-option 2:

Establishes a goal of investing USD [X] trillion globally in climate action by 2035 from all sources, public and private, domestic and international, in all Parties, and in furtherance of this goal:

Establishes a goal of [Parties in a position to contribute][all capable Parties] to mobilize jointly USD [100+] billion per year for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries by 2035, which is an extension of, and increase to, the existing goal referred to in decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8;

[Placeholder – qualitative elements, as below]

Notes that contributions to the goal described in paragraph [X] are without prejudice to any Party's development status or ability to receive climate finance support;

Sub-option 3:

Quantum: Striving towards global investment flows for climate finance at xx-trillions by 2035, and increasing the overall climate investment by xx-fold in developing countries;

Goal formulation: As part of a global effort, striving towards global investment flows for climate action at XX trillion by 2035, and increasing the overall climate investments by XX-fold in developing countries. A goal of XX billion USD in international climate finance provided and mobilized through public finance with a balance between mitigation and adaptation by 2035, delivered by a broader collective of contributors, reflecting the evolved and dynamic nature of Parties' GHG-emissions, economic capabilities as well as global solidarity;

Sub-option 4:

Agrees to strengthen efforts to increase and enable global investment flows, in line with the aim of the NCQG to contribute to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement of pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development, and in this regard:

Decides to sets a global target of at least USD [X trillion per year/%increase] of investment in climate action by 2035, with a target of USD [X/% increase] of investment in developing countries over the same period, from all sources of finance, including international and domestic, public and private sector investments, recognising that the achievement of this target will also require innovative, philanthropic and alternative sources of finance, action from all countries and partnership between a wide range of policy and financial actors;

In accordance with Article 9.3, *decides* to set a target of collectively mobilizing USD [100bn+] billion per annum by 2035 for developing countries from a wide range of sources and instruments including public, private, innovative and alternative sources, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and ambition, transformational adaptation and transparency on implementation, with the target to be pursued by developed countries and other countries with the economic capacity to contribute to the global effort, including those who are already significant contributors in bilateral or multilateral climate finance, and capturing efforts made by all other climate finance providers;

Sub-option 5:

Establishes global investment target of [x tn]/[percent increase] to progressively increase the level of financial resources available to support the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement globally from all countries and sources, including public, private, and philanthropic, and domestic and international, in line with Decision 9/CMA.3 paragraph 15 and Decision 14/CMA1 paragraph 2 in particular to limit further greenhouse gas emissions;

Urges [x tn]/[percentage increase] to be channeled to developing countries, with the aim of shifting global climate investments to developing countries:

In an effort to meet these targets, *also calls* on countries and private sector to:

(a) Establish domestic carbon pricing policies;

(b) Phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and public financing of the fossil fuel sector;

(i) Improve reporting of climate-related financial risks, including by expanding the coverage of mandatory climate-related financial disclosure requirements;

(c) Support efforts towards the development of domestic taxonomies;

(d) Reform the multilateral financial architecture to further unlock climate finance, including adaptation finance through enhanced support for disaster risk management and building of resilience, in line with decision 1/CMA.5 paragraph 95;

(e) Work to address systemic barriers to capital, notably by calling on all Parties, in particular bilateral creditors, to introduce climate resilient debt clauses into their lending arrangements, recognizing their role in managing debt burdens;

Establishes, in accordance with Article 9.3 and decision 14/CMA.1 paragraph 1, a collective public finance provided and mobilized support target [at least USD100B], from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation to be met by 2035;

Decides that the contributors to the goal include all those who are both high emitters, have a high per capita income criteria, including those who are already significant contributors in bilateral or multilateral climate finance, taking into account other national circumstances, excluding vulnerable and capacity-constrained countries;

Sub-option 6:

In accordance with Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement, *decides* that in order to achieve the aim in paragraph [XX], the new collective quantified goal will comprise a goal of increasing international investment flows to developing country Parties to USD X trillion by 2035 and a core goal of USD XXX bn per year by 2035 to be collectively mobilized for developing country Parties with developed country Parties taking the lead along with Parties in a position to do so, in the context of meaningful mitigation action, transformational adaptation, and transparency on implementation from a wide variety of sources;

[Outer layer] *Agrees* the goal of increasing international investment flows to developing country Parties to at least USD X-USD Ytn consists of calls to:

(a) Increase the quantity and quality of finance from all sources, recognising the importance of concessional finance, in particular for adaptation;

(b) Be ambition-responsive; supporting both global responses to the outcomes of the Global Stocktake and Parties' highest possible ambition as set out in national planning instruments, inter alia, Parties' Nationally Determined Contributions, Long-term low-emission development strategies, National Adaptation Plans, and Technology Action Plans;

(c) Increase support to developing country Parties to secure the most affordable finance;

(d) Be facilitated by domestic resource mobilization and the enhanced development and implementation of policies. Such policies should support finance towards the transition to a low-emission and climate resilient future, including, inter alia, establishing policy and regulatory environments that address mitigation and adaptation;

Core goal: Noting the significant role of public funds and the evolving circumstances and capabilities of Parties, urges Parties mobilising towards the core goal to:

(a) Improve the quality and quantity of finance directed towards adaptation;

(b) Recognize the challenges experienced by developing country Parties in accessing climate finance, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans;

(c) Reduce fragmentation in the climate finance system, including by prioritising the scaling up of existing projects and programmes, where appropriate, and coordinating to harmonise points of access and reporting requirements where possible;

(d) Provide further support for institutional capacity, as appropriate, in developing countries to access and manage climate finance, including targeted technical assistance and support for human and institutional capacity that responds to the needs and priorities of developing country Parties;

(e) Ensure financing instruments and modalities offered take into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, including country-driven strategies and locally-led action that are inclusive and empower vulnerable groups including women, girls, youth, children, workers, indigenous peoples, local communities, and people with disabilities;

Sub-option 7:

Decides to set a new collective quantified goal on climate finance of [USD X] of investment [globally][in developing country Parties][with a [particular focus on][target of] scaling up investment for developing countries] per year [by 2035][by 2035 through to 2040] from [all sources, public and private, domestic and international][all international and private sources];

Also decides to mobilize [USD X][at least USD 100 billion] per year [by 2035][by 2035 through to 2040] in climate finance to developing country Parties [from developed country Parties and other Parties] [[that meet the criteria] set out in the annex] with developed countries taking the lead][and *urges* contributions from developed country parties and [*encourages*] other Parties [[that meet the criteria] set out in the annex]] to make contributions;

61. *Further decides* to increase domestic resource mobilization for climate action through efforts by all Parties, consistent with national needs, priorities and circumstances, to support achievement of the goal referred to in paragraph X above;

62. *Decides* that the goal referred to in paragraph x above will be from Parties that meet one of the criteria:

(a) GNI per capita more than USD 52,000 in purchasing power parity;

(b) Among the top 10 emitters based on cumulative greenhouse gas emissions, with more than USD [20,000][22,000] GNI per capita in purchasing power parity;

(c) Cumulative and current emissions per capita of at least 250 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent and USD 40,000 GNI per capita in purchasing power parity;

63. *Also decides* that Parties that meet one of the criteria listed below are excluded from contributing to the goal referred to in paragraph x above:

(a) Parties classified as a low-income country with a risk of external debt distress;

(b) LDCs or SIDS, with a Human Development Index value lower than 0.9;

(c) Parties in fragile or conflict-affected situations;

Option 3: option 1 and 2 expressed as a cumulative goal or in combination with a cumulative goal over the time frame

64. *Emphasizes* that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be delivered in the context of the evolving needs and capacities of Parties, meaningful [climate][mitigation and transformational adaptation] action and ambition , and addressing loss and damage, and transparency on implementation;

65. *Decides* that, with the aim of supporting achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will seek to scale up investment flows to support achievement of ambitious nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and climate-resilient development objectives, and to enable a holistic response to the investment needs of developing countries;

66. Option 1: *Decides* to improve the balance between adaptation and mitigation finance, and to continue to mobilize support for cross-cutting efforts, including transparency, readiness, capacity-building and technology transfer;

Option 2: *Decides* that the goal referred to in para x above includes a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation; adequately addresses loss and damage and supports the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework in developing countries, including for the periodic preparation of BTRs;

Decides that the NCQG should consider resources for technology transfer and capacity building to support implementation of nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and long-term strategies;

Option 3: *Decides* that the goal referred to in paragraphs [X][X] above includes at least [X per cent][USD X] of climate finance for mitigation, [X per cent][USD X] of climate finance for adaptation, [X per cent][USD X] of climate finance for responding to loss and damage, [X per cent][USD X] of climate finance for readiness support and [X per cent][USD X] of climate finance for transparency provisions;

Option 4: *Decides* that the provision and mobilization of the NCQG include climate finance for at least mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, recognizing the importance of just transitions across sectors and thematic areas;

Decides that the NCQG will respond to current and future levels of ambition determined by developing country parties in their National Determined Contributions, Long Term Strategies, National Adaptation Plans, and National Communications;

Decides that the provision and mobilization components shall also support all developing country Parties in technology development and transfer, capacity building, and the implementation of transparency requirements under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

67. *Decides* to support developing countries in achieving the following outcomes by delivering on the goal referred to in paragraphs [X][X] above:

(a) Implementation of mitigation action in their country-driven strategies, [ambitious] nationally determined contributions and their contributions towards the global efforts identified in paragraph 28 of decision 1/CMA.5, including by reducing and / or avoiding xx tons of CO2eq;

(b) Implementation of adaptation action in their country-driven strategies, including comprehensive national adaptation plans and adaptation communications and their contributions towards the global goal on adaptation contained in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, in a manner that is complementary to the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including by increasing the resilience to climate change of xxx people and / or xxx km2 land and aquatic ecosystems;

68. *Welcomes and reaffirms* the ambitious and balanced outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28), in particular the UAE Consensus and the [Placeholder for name of Baku outcome] and recognizes that developing country Parties require support to reflect and implement nationally determined responses in their national plans, including in their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions in 2025 on the road to CMA 7 in Brazil;

69. *Decides* to support the efforts of developing countries on sustainable recovery resulting from natural disasters and conflicts, and ensure that those finance flows are in line with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement;

70. *Decides* that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be mobilized through a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels[, including public, private, innovative and alternative sources] [noting the significant role of public funds];

71. *Urges* developed country Parties to scale up finance from a wide range of financial instruments, including those that create fiscal space for developing countries, inter alia, debt-for-climate swaps, blended finance, guarantees, and equities, to be considered as a complement to public and grant-based finance;

72. *Highlights* the need for public resources for adaptation and loss and damage and *affirms* the importance of grant and concessional resources in this regard especially for developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States;

73. *Decides* that the provision from developed country Parties for adaptation and loss damage response shall be delivered through grant-based instruments;

74. *Highlights* that achieving the goal referred to in paragraphs [X][X] above will require innovative, philanthropic and alternative sources of finance, action from all Parties and partnership between a wide range of actors;

75. *Highlights* the importance of complementarity and coherence between all funding channels supporting the new collective quantified goal on climate finance;

76. *Recognizes* the need to ensure that climate finance sources and instruments facilitate reaching maximum global climate ambition while leaving no one behind, taking into account country-driven strategies and developing country needs and priorities;

77. *Acknowledges* the need to continue to explore, develop and scale up [as applicable and in the context of responding to developing country needs and priorities] innovative instruments aimed at mobilizing new sources of climate finance or to mobilize more private finance via blended finance instruments as well as to explore local currency lending, debt-for-climate swaps, hybrid capital, guarantees and first-loss instruments;

78. *Decides*;

(a) To consider the urgent need to reform the multilateral financial architecture, to reflect the current and evolving global dynamics, that can ensure climate justice, particularly for the LDCs and SIDS;

(b) To deliver the largest extent possible via the provision of grants-based public finance for adaptation and loss and damage, with the highest concessional levels given to LDCs and SIDS;

(c) That resources for readiness and transparency support shall be solely public and grant-based, in particular for LDCs and SIDS;

(d) To ensure that only resources that qualify as climate finance contribute to the NCQG:

(i) Climate finance delivered as part of the NCQG should be new and in additional to ODA. No development finance should be redirected or labelled as climate finance, and

(ii) support should align with priorities of developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS;

79. *Decides* that at least 20% of the financial resources of the NCQG should flow through the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention;

80. *Decides* that finance mobilized in the NCQG through debt instruments shall not exceed 50% of the total resources, including those resources delivered by inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, and through bilateral channels, multilateral funds, and multilateral development banks;

81. *Decides* that the delivery of the New Collective Quantified Goal shall reflect the following qualitative elements for a more balanced, comprehensive and accessible climate finance approach for developing countries:

(a) The scope of the goal shall be mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, technology transfer, capacity building and support for the implementation of transparency requirements under the Convention and its Paris Agreement and access shall be simplified and streamlined across all relevant channels of delivery for all the thematic areas reflected in this paragraph to enable developing countries to efficiently receive support;

(b) A complete balance between mitigation and adaptation shall be reflected in the delivery of the goal;

(c) The support for readiness and transparency shall cover the full and incremental cost for developing country Parties;

(d) The delivery of the goal shall be to the largest extent possible through grant-based and/or grant equivalent terms, with the provision element consisting only of grants as a priority to minimize the financial burden on developing countries;

(e) The delivery of the goal shall enable developing country Parties to equitably participate in the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies and enable technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries;

82. *Emphasizes* that climate finance provided and mobilized under the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be provided to developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States [through aiming to achieve a minimum allocation of [USD X][X per cent] per year][, with a view to providing an equitable distribution to all developing country geographical regions in accordance with their special circumstances] [and recognizing the need to respond to ambition in climate action];

83. Option 1*: Decides* that the new collective quantified goal is exclusively for all developing countries;

Option 2: *Decides* it must be accessible to all developing countries, with special provisions for LDCs and SIDS;

Option 3: *Decides* that climate finance under the NCQG will be for all developing country Parties by providing regional allocation floors with a view of equitable distribution to all developing country geographical regions;

84. *Further decides* that climate finance provided and mobilized shall be to developing countries and shall aim to achieve equitable resource distribution to all developing country geographical regions in accordance with their special circumstances;

85. *Urges* Parties and other relevant actors to continue to take into account the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS in the provision of climate finance;

86. *Underscores* the need to improve access to climate finance for developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, [as well as impacted communities, subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, women, people with disabilities, migrants, refugees, workers, youth and children,] across all channels of support, in a manner that supports country-driven strategies and plans;

87. *Recognizes* the importance of efficient and effective access for developing countries, in particular for LDCs and SIDS, and the challenges associated with delayed access to climate finance in terms of mitigation and adaptation ambition;

88. *Recognizes* that access has many aspects, including harmonization and capacity-building from both a supply and demand side, and highlights the need for an integrated approach to access, which is reflected as well through the transparency arrangements;

89. *Emphasizes* the need to enhance access to finance, in particular for the LDCs and SIDS by:

(a) Promoting fairer financial flows by scaling up and prioritising direct access;

(b) Strengthening capacity of human resources and national institutions;

(c) Simplifying application and disbursement processes;

(d) Establishing flexible information requirements, especially those related to climate rationale;

(e) Reducing co-financing requirements and minimising conditionalities;

(f) Creating minimum allocation floors for LDCs and SIDS, in particular for adaptation, and loss and damage response;

(g) Ensuring that concessionality level of climate finance provided and mobilised must take into account the precarious levels of debt distress, and to ensure debt sustainability, the cost of capital should be well below medium-term growth rates.

(h) Indebtedness and transaction costs must be taken into consideration;

90. *Decides* that fiscal constraints and debt sustainability are considered in the provision and mobilization of climate finance in the NCQG and prevent them from becoming conditionalities for access;

91. *Urges* developed country Parties, operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, and other climate finance providers and entities to enhance access to climate finance for developing country Parties, taking into account country-driven strategies, including harmonizing and streamlining policies and processes; simplifying application, approval, and disbursement processes; prioritizing and standardizing direct access modalities, including at national and subnational levels; strengthening human and institutional capacity in developing countries including for project formulation and

implementation; reducing administrative burden for the approval of smaller funding amounts and making greater use of programmatic approaches; reducing co-financing requirements; by leaving no one behind;

92. *Emphasises* that access to climate finance should be based on simplified and harmonised access and approval procedures, standardisation and prioritisation of direct access modalities, taking into account country-driven strategies and the inclusion of vulnerable groups including women, girls, youth, children, workers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and people with disabilities;

93. *Emphasizes* that there shall not be conditions for the access to finance and that all elements of the goal must respect countries ‘sovereignty;

94. *Emphasizes* that disenablers of finance often exacerbated by and within developed countries including through an asymmetric international financial architecture must be addressed to enable access to quality and concessional climate finance and decision-making by developed countries;

95. *Emphasizes* the need to address systemic access inequities for developing country Parties, in particular LDCs and SIDS including inter alia: the high cost of capital, high transitions costs, capacity constraints, and indiscriminate assumptions of corruption;

96. *Urges* developed country Parties, [other Parties,] operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and other climate finance providers and entities to enhance access to climate finance through bilateral and multilateral channels for developing country Parties, taking into account country-driven strategies, including by, as applicable, harmonizing and streamlining policies and processes; simplifying application, approval and disbursement processes; prioritizing and standardizing direct access modalities, including at national and subnational levels; strengthening human and institutional capacity in developing countries; reducing administrative burden for the approval of smaller funding amounts and making greater use of programmatic approaches; and improving access to climate-related data and information;

97. *Requests* developed country Parties, and operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to enhance access to climate finance across all channels of support;

98. *Further requests* developed country Parties to ensure streamlined access features across all channels of support;

99. *Urges* bilateral climate finance providers to reduce fragmentation in the climate finance system, including by prioritising scaling up existing projects and programmes, where appropriate, and coordinating to harmonise and make reporting requirements contextually appropriate;

100. *Urges* other bilateral, regional and multilateral entities are encouraged to implement measures to enhance access to climate finance and report on their planned and implemented actions;

101. *Urges* Operating Entities of the Financial Mechanism to further harmonize and streamline their policies and processes to accelerate access to concessional finance, including simplifying requirements for climate data and rationale, enhancing direct access modalities, making greater use of programmatic approaches, and delegating approval of smaller funding amounts;

102. *Urges* the Operating entities of the Financial Mechanisms should lead on the implementation of measures to enhancing access to climate finance, and report on a frequent basis the measures planned and implemented;

103. *Notes* significant access challenges faced by particularly vulnerable and capacity constrained developing country recipients, including Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and fragile and conflict-affected states, as well as by Indigenous Peoples and other people and communities that are on the frontlines of climate change within their respective countries;

104. *Encourages* Parties to continue to enhance access to climate finance through bilateral, regional and multilateral channels, including by, where feasible, making efforts to:

(a) Continue to take into account debt sustainability levels when providing and mobilizing resources;

(b) Enhance local ownership through supporting modalities, such as direct access at the subnational and community levels, notably by working with local civil society and Indigenous Peoples organizations, where appropriate;

(c) Support efforts to address systemic inequities to access for developing country recipients, including variables that affect the high cost of capital and transaction costs, and capacity constraints;

105. *Urges* Parties and providers of climate finance to ensure that climate finance provides a benefit and is available in particular to Indigenous Peoples, women and youth;

106. *Urges* Parties and other relevant actors to promote the inclusion of vulnerable communities and groups in climate finance efforts, including women and girls, children and youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, migrants and refugees, communities in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and workers;

107. *Recognizes* the need for capacity-building and technology transfer to build the capacity of recipient countries to increase absorption capacity;

108. *Emphasizes* the need to address capacity constraints in conflict-affected areas in accessing climate finance;

109. *Urges* further support for sustained capacity building in developing countries, particularly SIDS and LDCs and other countries with significant capacity constraints, to access and manage climate finance, including targeted technical assistance and support for human and institutional capacity that responds to the needs and priorities of developing countries;

110. Option 1*: Decides* to continue to enhance enabling environments and policy frameworks to increase investment in climate action and to facilitate the mobilization and effective deployment of climate finance;

Option 2: *Call*s on all Parties to enhancing enabling environments and policy frameworks, including by, as appropriate/applicable:

(a) Mainstreaming climate action into macroeconomic and fiscal policy, budgeting and procurement processes and development cooperation and foreign direct investment policies;

(b) Develop robust and climate-specific, whole of government strategies, investment plans, pipelines and platforms to support the delivery of NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS;

(c) Develop fiscal and economic policy levers to tackle market failures and other barriers to climate investments;

(d) Introduce measures to manage macroeconomic and financial climate-related risks;

(e) Addressing flows running counter to climate objectives, including phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, which do not address energy poverty or just transition, without further delay;

(f) Improving frameworks to assess debt sustainability and determine the existing levels of debt servicing capacity of developing countries, in particular LDCs and SIDS;

(g) Enhance mobilization of domestic resources;

Option 3: *Requests* Parties to enhance the development and implementation of policies in a nationally determined manner, which push and pull investments into the geographies and sectors, where they are most needed to finance the transition to a low-emission and climate resilient future to facilitate the achievement of [reference to paragraphs capturing international support goal and investment component of the goal], and report these efforts in the context of the narrative part of their Biennial Transparency Reports;

Option 4: *Calls* on all Parties to continue enhancing their enabling environments and policy frameworks to facilitate the mobilization and effective deployment of climate finance, and increase the absorptive capacity of countries, including by:

(a) Mainstreaming sustainability, adaptation and climate action into macroeconomic and fiscal policy, budgeting and procurement processes and development cooperation and foreign direct investment policies, including through a systematically greening domestic fiscal spending, increasing the use of green finance products, such as green bonds and green loans, managing currency and macroeconomic risks to reduce the cost of capital to foster increased investments in mitigation and adaptation;

(b) Introducing measures to assess and manage macroeconomic and financial climate-related risks;

111. *Urges* Parties to enhance their efforts to significantly increase domestic resource mobilization and improve enabling environments for ambitious climate action;

112. *Underscores* the importance of developing robust pipelines of investable projects and urges Parties to redouble their efforts to build domestic capacities in this regard;

113. *Requests* developed country Parties, based on lesson learned from the delivery of the USD 100 billion, to urgently reform their budgetary practices to reflect the following enhancements to enable the delivery of the New Collective Quantified Goal through:

(a) moving from annual to multiyear budgets and long-term programming of climate finance;

(b) streamlining approval process for climate change support budget; and

(c) prioritizing climate change support as a separate budget category with special procedures;

114. *Further requests* developed country Parties to report on the implementation of the reform of their budgetary processes in their next Biennial Communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, and reflect the following information:

(a) a plan to initiate the reform, including timelines, approaches, challenges and opportunities;

(b) a deadline for the conclusion of the reform;

(c) guidebook on access modalities across all relevant channels;

115. *Recognizing* the need for incentivizing action in order to reach the new collective quantified goal, *urges* [developed country] Parties [[and other climate finance providers][all relevant actors]] to consider the following actions to facilitate the mobilization of climate finance and investment flows in climate outcomes in a nationally determined manner in the context of the implementation of [reference to paragraphs capturing international support goal and investment component of the goal]:

(a) Establishing polices and incentives, as appropriate, to promote ambitious climate action, including by adopting credible, effective and transparent climate plans and strategies;

(b) Scaling up the provision of grant-based and highly concessional finance across all channels by ensuring the effective deployment of blended financing instruments and concessional loans, while also scaling alternative and innovative financial instruments aimed at mobilizing new sources of finance;

(c) Reforming the multilateral financial architecture, including multilateral development banks, by calling on their shareholders to expeditiously scale up the provision of climate finance by deploying a full suite of instruments such as grants, guarantees and non-debt instruments, taking into account debt burdens;

(d) Taking into account debt sustainability in the provision and mobilization of climate finance, including by scaling up local currency lending and foreign exchange risk instruments, introducing climate-resilient debt clauses into lending arrangements [by 2035] and scaling up the use of debt forgiveness and debt-for-climate swaps;

(e) Option 1: Continuing to support countries' efforts to reduce their cost of capital for climate action, as appropriate;

Option 2: Continuing to support countries' efforts to reduce their cost of capital for climate action in developing countries, including through the use of insurance, guarantees, first-loss capital, and other mechanisms to de-risk investments as appropriate;

(a) Transparently implementing the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Services Suspension Initiative [and extending it particularly for the least developed countries and small island developing States];

(b) Improving the predictability of climate finance flows by enhancing coordination efforts among climate finance stakeholders, including through the use of country platforms and whole-of-government strategies, and mainstreaming climate finance into budgetary systems and macroeconomic fiscal policy and planning;

(c) Maximizing the interoperability of sustainable finance frameworks globally to reduce cross-border barriers to climate finance flows;

(d) [Addressing flows running counter to climate objectives, including] phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions [as soon as possible][by 2035][by 2025][Assessing the negative impacts of unilateral measures, taking action to phase out those measure and mitigate their impacts, as well as promote a supportive and open international economic system aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth and development in all countries and thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change];

(e) Assessing the negative impacts of unilateral measures and action to mitigate these impacts [by 2028];

(f) Accelerating the implementation of climate-related financial disclosure requirements [to cover at least 70 per cent of publicly listed assets by 2035], by aligning operations with the objectives of the Paris Agreement [and scaling down financial flows running counter to the goals of the Paris Agreement];

(g) Enacting regulatory capital and rating agency policy reform to help achieve consistency in capital treatment of transactions across jurisdictions, recognition of the risk mitigating features of blended finance and other strategies such as A/B loan structures, updating prudential capital requirements for banks, insurance companies and pension funds to reflect the actual risk of investment in emerging markets and developing economies, and updating external ratings methodologies by adjusting subjective risk premiums assigned to emerging markets and developing economies and incorporating climate risk parameters into credit rating assessments;

(h) Planning climate financing in an integrated and holistic manner that supports sustainable development;

(i) Mainstreaming gender-responsiveness in both processes related to, and outcomes of, climate finance provision and mobilization [by 2035];

(j) Ensuring a non-discriminatory access for all Parties and their private financial and non-financial sectors to international financial markets, instruments and other sources of finance for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention in the context of sustainable development and effort to eradicate poverty, including elimination of all existing limitations;

(k) Supporting just transitions in carbon intensive sectors, recognizing special difficulties of those countries, especially developing countries, whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels;

(l) Upholding the principle of technological neutrality in provision of climate finance, i.e. supporting all available technologies, solutions to reduce or remove greenhouse gas emissions, while acknowledging the prerogative of Parties to prioritize technology measures, including those identified in technology needs assessments, technology action plans and long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies that align with national circumstances;

(m) [Steer investments in developing countries]

116. *Notes* that the actions outlined in paragraph X above shall not imply conditionalities for access to climate finance;

117. *Underscores* that there is a positive connection between addressing dis-enablers including limited fiscal space, high levels of debt, and high cost of capital, and advancing on a pathway towards low emissions and climate-resilient development in developing countries;

118. *Encourages* Parties and other relevant actors to explore the use of and scale-up, as appropriate, innovative sources of finance, including, inter alia, debt for nature swaps, green bonds, and high-integrity voluntary carbon markets;

119. *Urges* Parties and other relevant actors to continue to enhance their climate finance coordination efforts, including through the use of, inter alia, country platforms, as appropriate;

120. *Resolves* to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of climate finance, including through transparency of resource provision, mobilization and use, which will enable ambitious climate action and policy on the ground in order to deliver a long-term impact and results in the form of emission reductions and climate resilience;

121. *Calls* for a mechanism that includes local currency finance;

122. *Calls* for phasing out substantial climate subsidy packages exceeding USD 100 billion in incentives, including tax breaks, in developed country Parties, in particular within developed country Parties with a population exceeding 300 million people, by 2028;

123. Developed country Parties shall assess the negative impacts of their unilateral trade measures and take action to mitigate these impacts as well;

124. *Agrees* to:

(a) Significantly reduce the cost of capital by 2030 to support low emissions and climate resilient development;

(b) Significantly increase the mobilisation ratio of finance mobilized from public sources by 2030;

(c) Expand significantly the use of financial instruments in an equitable and just manner, such as first-loss instruments and guarantees taking into account national circumstances;

(d) Significantly enhance mobilisation ratio of finance mobilized from public sources by 2030;

(e) Scale up use of local currency financing, foreign exchange risk instruments, climate-resilient debt clauses into financing arrangements by 2035;

125. *Recognizes* importance of the broader financial landscape and *calls* upon all actors, including governments, central banks, public banks, commercial banks, multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions, the private sector, philanthropies, institutional investors and other financial actors, to scale up their efforts in providing, mobilizing and catalysing resources and investments, to publicly provide

transparent information and applying environmental and social safeguards to avoid greenwashing, and to create and strengthen enabling conditions that support upscaling of finance flows for climate action, including by, as applicable:

(a) Domestic financial regulators and supervisors and relevant international fora to work on making the financial system fit for purpose, including by addressing physical and transition risks for financial institutions and investors, and improve the necessary transparency;

(b) MDBs and IFIs and their stakeholders to continue and accelerate efforts to align their operations with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, increase the amount, impact and accessibility of their contribution to climate finance, incl. concessional finance and deployment of diversified instruments, and measure and improve impact;

(c) The private sector and all other relevant actors, especially in fossil fuel industry, to contribute to climate action and align their operations with the Paris Agreement, including by supporting with capacity building, technology development and transfer and to invest in and support developing countries;

(d) Central banks and national supervisors to mainstream climate considerations into their operations;

(e) Official export credit agencies and private credit insurers align financing, guarantees, insurance and reinsurance of export transactions with the goals of the Paris Agreement;

(f) Insurance and reinsurance companies to ensure that their underwriting and investment strategies and practices are decarbonized and made climate resilient;

(g) Credit rating agencies and domestic and international regulators to ensure that credit rating integrates material climate risks and transaction risks, incl. Risks associated with long-term time horizons;

126. *Urges* finance providers, including multilateral development banks, multilateral funds, and bilateral channels to increase the financing available to address the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties by providing affordable long-term financing grant-based instruments for all developing countries, as well as encourages including features such as inter alia, local currency, natural disaster and force majeure clauses, minimum mandatory grace periods for repayments and preferential 4 maturity date; and revert perverse incentives that penalize ambition, while addressing high capital and transaction costs;

127. *Urges* the multilateral development banks, multilateral funds, financial institutions, and other relevant international fora to make the financial system fit for purpose with the Paris Agreement objectives by, inter alia, aligning their operations to the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries in their pursue of a low-emissions and climate-resilient development or creating more economic burdens to developing countries, addressing climate risks, and scaling up climate finance to developing countries both through grants, highly concessional instruments and by reinforcing private investment through de-risking and risk-sharing mechanisms;

128. *Encourages* shareholders of the MDBs to continue to advance efforts to promote an evolution agenda for better, bigger, and more effective MDBs to address global challenges and maximize impact in developing countries;

129. *Calls* upon shareholders of multilateral development banks and national development finance institutions to provide incentives to private sector creditors to replace or refinance high-cost private sector sovereign loans and debt with lower-cost, long-term, and more transparent and resilient debt, as appropriate, including through new concessional finance, debt swaps, and debt conversions for developing country Parties that proactively and voluntarily manage debt burdens and whose NDCs represent high ambition;

130. *Calls* upon shareholders of international financial institutions to coordinate on a package of measures to allow high ambition countries to service their debt while making investments in low-emission, climate resilient growth, and for bilateral and multilateral

climate finance to provide aligned support packages for high ambition countries to undertake climate investments and economic reforms;

131. *Calls* on the MDBs to undertake comprehensive efforts to evolve their vision, incentive structures, operational approaches and financial capacities so that they are better equipped to maximize their impact in addressing a wide range of global challenges, including climate change;

132. *Encourages* shareholders of IFIs and DFIs to continue to support developing countries, including through local currency lending and concessional finance, as appropriate;

133. *{Invites* Parties to} *Supports* the continued implementation of the G20 CAF Review's recommendations, including on hybrid capital, callable capital and portfolio guarantees;

134. *Affirms* that we will collectively mobilize more headroom and concessional finance to boost the World Bank's capacity to support low and middle-income countries that need help in addressing global challenges, with a clear framework for the allocation of limited concessional resources, with focused support for the poorest countries;

135. *Commits* to take corresponding action to align and scale up finance flows towards clean energy, including to strengthen clean energy supply chains and to cooperate to bring down the cost of clean energy technologies globally, in turn reducing the cost of climate action and subsequent investment needs;

136. *Recognizes* the role of the multilateral climate change funds in scaling up climate finance, including those that are operating entities of the Financial Mechanism serving the Paris Agreement, which have operating modalities that enable them to foster transformational change and encourages all Parties in a capacity to do so to contribute to the multilateral climate change funds;

137. *Affirms* the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group recommendations for scaling up blended finance and risk-sharing facilities, and its wider work in implementing the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap;

138. *Encourages* Parties to work with private sector actors to continue to scale-up private sector investments in mitigation and adaptation action across all geographic regions and sectors, in particular in developing countries;

139. *Acknowledges* that in the context of aligning international public support towards the clean energy transition the value of initiatives like the Clean Energy Transition Partnership established at COP26;

140. *Calls* on creditor country Parties to assist {high ambition} developing country Parties, in the context of broader work toward structural reform, coordinated action by creditor countries, and transparent, sustainable, and resilient financing, and to explore the adoption of clauses to {automatically} provide sovereign debt service suspension when {developing}{debtor} country Parties experience climate related disasters;

141. *Decides* to promote debt sustainability, calling on all bilateral creditors to improve debt transparency and to support reforms which help the most vulnerable countries to sustainably manage public debt levels;

142. *Calls* {on certain actors} for {the certain, timely and transparent implementation of the Common Framework, and for its extension to include}{including the needs of} {SIDS and} LDCs {in the Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the Debt Services Suspension Initiative, to also include debt relief, debt forgiveness and debt servicing assistance}{, noting the need for practical step-by-step information, including indicative timelines, on debt restructuring under the Common Framework};

143. *Recognises* the role of climate resilient debt clauses can play in making sovereign debt burdens more climate resilient by freeing up fiscal resources to respond to the impacts of climate change, and call on parties, in particular bilateral creditors, to introduce climate resilient debt clauses into their lending arrangements;

144. *Acknowledges* that limited consistency of investment activity with the Paris Agreement results in significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets, and other additional costs and urges Parties to scale up financial flows for climate action while scaling down financial flows that run counter to or create barriers for mitigation and adaptation action;

145. *Recognizes* that many firms and financial institutions have announced net zero emissions targets and have begun to publicly disclose their transition plans and strategies, and calls on more financial institutions to make and follow through on this commitment;

146. *Commits* to unlocking greater amounts of sustainable finance globally, including by strengthening market and regulatory architecture, such as sustainable finance taxonomies, which help to improve transparency and reduce the risk of greenwashing;

147. *Encourages* sustainability disclosures by the financial sector, noting its multiple benefits such as access to capital, lower financing costs, enhanced reputation, and better risk management, in the context of increasing climate finance flows and aligning financial flows with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

148. *Urges* Parties and other relevant actors to promote the application of robust financial, environmental, social, and governance safeguards to avoid greenwashing in the implementation of climate financing efforts;

149. *Calls* on rating entities, supervisors, and regulators to improve risk assessment methodologies so that exposure to climate risks and natural disasters does not impact downgrade sovereign credit ratings while valuing the positive impact of ambitious climate change policies and long-term investments in climate action and resilience on a country's projections;

150. *Calls* to reduce investment flows towards fossil fuel infrastructure, while acknowledging the need for certain investments, including towards repurposing and future-proofing infrastructure being compatible with a 1.5°C pathway;

151. *Agrees* to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible, recognising the importance of this action to unlocking greater financial resources for climate action;

152. *Calls* that a global quantitative target to cover a significant amount of global emissions by carbon pricing by 2030 and reach ambitious carbon prices by 2035;

153. *Acknowledges* the need to continue to explore and develop, as applicable and in line with national circumstances equitably designed domestic and international innovative instruments aimed at mobilizing new sources of finance, such as carbon pricing, including targeted towards the fossil fuel sector and other high-emitting sectors in line with the polluter pays principle, to mobilize more private finance via blended finance instruments, as well as to address specific barriers to accessing climate finance, such as climate resilient debt clauses, debt-for-climate swaps, local currency lending hybrid capital, guarantees;

154. *Recognizes* the importance of transparency of climate finance flows, including predictability and clarity of information on financial support for developing country Parties, for the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

155. *Highlights* the importance of transparency of results and impacts from climate finance in order to continue attracting finance. In this regard suggest reporting on the results from the NCQG/climate finance;

156. Option 1: *Notes* the diversity of definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and non-Party stakeholders in the context of aggregate accounting of and reporting on climate finance;

Option 2: *Notes* the diversity of definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and non-Party stakeholders, decides that the goal shall not include non-concessional loans, loans at market rates that are set at better terms for elements other than interest rates, export credits, investments and any other instruments that will result in a net-economic negative outcome for recipients or debt-inducive, and it shall be new and additional to official development assistance and other official flows;

157. Option 1: *Decides* that finance mobilized through the new collective quantified goal on climate finance should [promote co-benefits between climate action and sustainable development][be new and additional to official development assistance][exclude market-rate loans, all private finance, domestic resources and export credits];

Option 2: *Decides* that support shall not include non-concessional loans, loan at market rates that are set at better terms for elements other than interest rates, export credits, investments and any other instruments that will result in a net-negative economic outcome for recipients. This support shall be additional to ODA and other official flows;

Option 3: *Decides* that resources under the new collective quantified goal must be new and additional, predictable, adequate, consistent, affordable, grant-based and concessional, enhancing fiscal space for all vulnerable developing countries without creating additional fiscal constraints, non-debt inducive, and should not include, inter alia, non-concessional loas and export credits;

Option 4: *Decides* that, building on the operational definition of climate finance adopted by the SCF, climate finance is from developed to developing countries and must be provided and mobilized in the form of grants and highly-concessional funds;

Option 5: *Decides* that the financing of the NCQG shall be new, additional, adequate, affordable, grant-based, highly concessional, and non-debt inducive to support all developing countries, particularly as they transition in a just and equitable manner;

Decides that finance provided and mobilized through the NCQG should be new and additional to official development assistance, excluding instruments at market-rates, north-north flows, domestic and debt-inducing instruments;

158. Option 1: *Further decides* that for any climate finance flow to count towards the achievement of the [provision] goal it must have the following minimum attributes:

(a) be ‘additional’ to any finance classified as official development assistance and other official flows[2] and finance committed under other international regimes, and be ‘new’ finance as opposed to retagged/repurposed official development assistance;

(b) have minimum financial terms and conditions for non-grant instruments, such as interest rates, grace periods, maturity periods, and any service, administrative or commitment charge, that are well below the prevailing market terms and conditions;

(c) be primarily grant-based resources for adaptation, and loss and damage response;

(d) be solely grant-based resource for readiness support and transparency support

(e) not contribute to the expansion and continuation of the production of fossil fuels;

(f) not be in the form of export credits;

Option 2: *Recalls* challenges in accounting and comparing data due to use of different accounting methodologies and *decides* that the following principles shall be applied in the application of the MPGs:

(a) Finance provided at market rate loans and export credits shall not be counted in the aggregate of what counts as climate finance.

(b) Accounting of concessional finance shall consider grant-equivalence

[2] Official development assistance and other official flows as classified under the OECD.

(c) Climate specificity shall be considered in provision of information.

(d) Climate finance shall be additional to development finance;

Option 3: *Also decides* that only resources that qualify as climate finance should count towards the delivery of the goal:

(a) Climate finance delivered as part of the NCQG should be new and in addition to ODA. No development finance should be redirected or labelled as climate finance;

(b) Climate finance under the NCQG shall not include export credits and non-concessional finance;

(c) Only finance clearly targeting mitigation, adaptation and/ or loss and damage should be part of the goal;

(d) Contribution of private climate finance and how they have been accounted for must be part of the transparency reports including very granular information on how and at what levels it has been leveraged, mobilized and delivered;

(e) Adequate inclusion of loss and damage in the transparency arrangements;

159. Option 1: *Requests* [developed country Parties and *encourages*] [Parties contributing to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance] to report on their financial support provided and mobilized and *encourages* developing country Parties to report their financial support needed and received in biennial transparency reports[, starting in 2026,] [up until 2038];

Also requests [developed country Parties][Parties contributing to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance] to communicate biennially indicative quantitative and qualitative information, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources consistent with Article 9, paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement [and *encourages* other Parties providing resources to communicate such information on a voluntary basis];

Option 2: *Reaffirms* the Enhanced Transparency Framework and Article 9 paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Paris Agreement and *recognises* that they will serve as the transparency arrangements {of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance};

Option 3: *Decides* that the framework for transparency of support established in Article 13, paragraph 6 of the Paris Agreement shall be the basis of the transparency arrangements for the goal;

Further decides that the biennial transparency reports of developed country Parties, in particular the chapter on 'information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity building support provided and mobilised', shall constitute the primary information necessary to track progress made in achieving the goal;

Option 4: *Decides* that the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) should be a part of the transparency arrangements of the NCQG, the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTR) should be the main source of information for the monitoring and reporting of the NCQG (finance provided and mobilised by developed countries);

Further decides that reports under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement should also be part of the transparency arrangements of the NCQG, and where possible their information compiled and included as part of NCQG progress reports (LDC);

Option 5: *Agrees* the transparency arrangements for the NCQG are to be anchored in existing reporting mechanisms under the Paris Agreement [to help avoid additional burdens on developing country Parties], including inter alia the Enhanced Transparency Framework, and the Standing Committee on Finance biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows;

Option 6: *Decides* that the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement will serve as the transparency arrangements of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance and *recognizes* the need to ensure report on both quantitative and qualitative elements, climate specificity of fund flows, excluding instruments that exacerbate debt;

160. *Requests* Parties and *urges* all other actors, which are contributing to the global effort to achieve [reference to the paragraph with international support goal], to transparently report their climate finance provided and mobilized in line with the parameters of the enhanced transparency framework and consistent with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;

161. *Stresses* that the ETF and its MPGs shall be updated in 2028 in order to be fit for purpose and allow accountability of all elements included in the NCQG;

162. *Recalls* that only the Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines of the Enhanced Transparency Framework will be reviewed in 2028 and that developed country Parties shall provide information on finance provided and mobilised biennially within their Biennial Transparency Reports;

163. *Requests* the developed country Parties to report the finance provided and mobilized in the NCQG in their Biennial Communications and the ETF, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, and Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;

164. *Decides* that developed country Parties shall provide information on finance provided and mobilized in the first half of 2028 as they aim to submit their full Biennial Transparency Reports by the end of the year in 2028;

165. *Invites* data aggregators, in developing their progress reports to engage an independent third party to review and assess their reports and to include such reviews in the annex of their progress reports;

166. *Acknowledges* the importance of forward-looking communications in Article 9.5 in enhancing predictability of finance and *decides* that these communications shall undergo an expert review and be a source of information to the multilateral facilitative process to enable transparency of support;

167. *Stresses* the fulfilment by developed country Parties in line with Article 9, paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Paris Agreement;

168. *Invites* [developed country Parties][Parties contributing to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance][the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice] to develop transparency arrangements for tracking progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, building on the enhanced transparency framework, biennial communications and the experience of tracking progress towards the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year, for consideration at CMA [8][x];

169. *Emphasises* the need for annual progress updates of the achievement of the goal, and *decides* that each developed country Party shall, in the years that a biennial transparency report is not due under the Paris Agreement, provide an intermediate update of 'information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity building support provided and mobilised' and the corresponding common tabular format for the intermediate reporting year in accordance with the relevant guidelines contained in chapter VI of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, and the guidance contained in annex III to decision 5/CMA.3, to the secretariat, starting with the submission of the first intermediate update of information on climate finance provision and mobilisation for 2025 no later than the end of February 2027;

170. Option 1*:* *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to [annually][biennially] report on collective progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance [in stand-alone reports][as part of its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows], commencing in 20[xx], on the basis of all relevant [and available data] sources[, including information provided or made available in biennial transparency reports, submissions on access to climate finance as per paragraph x above and other sources of information, to be published no later than four weeks prior to each session of the CMA for consideration at that session;

Option 2: *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare an independent report on the progress in delivery of the New Collective Quantified Goal drawing from a synthesis of information in the biennial transparency reports, biennial communication and any other relevant reporting source from developed country Parties under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement;

Option 3: *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare a report on progress towards delivery of the New Collective Quantified Goal on a biennial basis, including progress on both qualitative and quantitative considerations, taking into account enhanced transparency framework, the Biennial Assessment and other relevant reports, for consideration by the CMA on a biennial basis from CMA 8;

Option 4: *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to report on progress towards achieving the NCQG a in stand-alone report and stresses the link between the NCQG and the long-term climate finance agenda item;

Option 5: *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance, as part of the Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, to assess the collective progress made toward the achievement of all elements of the NCQG for the consideration of the CMA, drawing on all relevant sources of information;

Option 6: *Further decides* that reporting on progress of implementation and delivery of the NCQG should be done on a biennial basis, through a dedicated stand-alone report, prepared and published within the UNFCCC;

Option 7: *Requests* the secretariat to prepare an annual progress report on the achievement of the goal comprising of, inter alia, a compilation and synthesis of the relevant information and data included in the biennial transparency reports and intermediate updates referred to paragraphs X and X of this decision, as well as a compilation and synthesis of information and data from annual reports on access enhancement referred to paragraph X of this decision, no later than four weeks prior to each session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

Option 8: *Encourages* contributing Parties to the mobilization goal described in paragraph [X] above, to consider producing a regular report on collective progress made toward the achievement of the support goal, taking into consideration the preparation of the Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows by the Standing Committee on Finance and other relevant Paris Agreement processes;

171. Option 1: *Also requests* developed country Parties and other climate finance providers as applicable and available to submit [via the submission portal] [to the Standing Committee on Finance][biennially][annually][on a regular basis] [through existing national reporting communications] information on [their efforts to enhance access to climate finance where data are available][approval processes and time frames for approving projects and programmes; transactional costs for accessing climate finance; and geographical distribution of recipients who accessed climate finance during the period covered by the submission, including, where available, data disaggregated by regional group and the least developed countries and small island developing States];

Option 2: *Requests* developed country Parties and all channels to annually report to the secretariat on the following minimum access enhancement indicators:

(a) the average length of time it takes for a recipient to access climate finance from each developed country Parties and each channel (i.e. from concept inception to final disbursement),

(b) the average costs associated with accessing climate finance from each developed country Party and each channel,

(c) the geographical distribution of recipients that have accessed climate finance from each developed country Party and each channel, disaggregated among the United Nations regional groups as well as least developed countries and small island developing States, and

(d) the distribution of instruments used in the provision and mobilisation of climate finance from each channel, disaggregated among the United Nations regional groups as well as least developed countries and small island developing States;

172. *Also decides* that transparency reports must reflect disaggregation of data or information provided to or mobilised for LDCs and SIDs:

(a) for climate finance that has been accessed including for adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage,

(b) for types of instruments, and

(c) for access channels;

173. Option 1: *Decides* to review progress on implementing the new collective quantified goal on climate finance when considering the aggregate biennial reports on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance referred to in paragraph X above in the context of matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance;

Option 2: *Decides* to review progress on implementing the [new collective quantified goal on climate finance][goal's quantum] as part of the [second global stocktake, in 2028][third global stocktake, in 2033];

Option 3: *Decides* to review progress on implementing [various aspects of the goal][the goal][goal's quantum] [in 2031] and that the review will commence one session before [CMA 11 (2029)][CMA 12 (2030)][CMA 13 (2031)] and will be conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in annex [x], [, taking into account the outcomes of the global stocktake,] with a view to providing recommendations for [improved implementation of the goal][revising the [goal][goal's quantum] at CMA [11 (2029)][12 (2030)][13 (2031)]:

Option 4: *Decides* that the goal shall be effective from 2025 through 2035, and *affirms* that the goal will remain in effect as a minimum floor until the conclusion of the deliberations to adjust the goal by the CMA in accordance with this decision;

Further decides to conduct a midterm review of its adequacy and level of fulfilment, commencing at its session in 2030 and completing at its session in 2031, in accordance with the guidelines in annex X to this decision, and to take appropriate measures to adjust the goal['s quantum] taking into account the outcome of the review;

Decides to conduct its overall periodic review and adjustment process of the goal, commencing at its session in 2033 and completing at its session in 2034, in accordance with the guidelines in annex X to this decision;

Option 5: *Decides* to review and extend the New Collective Quantified Goal during the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement in 2029, [focusing on the following elements

a) updating the quantum,

b) updating the burden-sharing arrangements of developed country Parties;

Option 6: *Decides* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement in 2029 shall review and extend the New Collective Quantified Goal by updating the quantum, access and quality elements of the goal in line with the evolving needs of developing country Parties;

Option 7: *Decides* to review the quantum of the goal and, if appropriate, update it by 2030, further decides to set a new goal in 2035;

Option 8: *Decides* that the NCQG will be revised every 10 years and modified if necessary to tackle the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties for adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage to ensure its adequacy based on the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries and best available science;

174. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties to affirm the goal, including all its features and transparency arrangements, as the successor to the existing collective mobilisation goal in accordance with obligations under the Convention and further invites the Conference of the Parties to monitor its progress under its long-term climate finance agenda item;

Annex A Guidelines for the goal's overall midterm review and adjustment

175. This process is same as the one for the overall review and adjustment with the exception of the following:

(a) Scope and outcome are only focused on the quantum,

(b) Timeframe is 2030-2031;

Annex B Guidelines for the goal's overall periodic review and adjustment

I. Objective and scope

176. In accordance with paragraph X of this decision, the objective of the overall periodic review and adjustment process will be to review the adequacy of the collective quantified goal on climate finance (CQG) based on the best available science and knowledge, and the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties, and taking into account, inter alia, the outcomes of process under the UNFCCC such as the global stocktake of the Paris Agreement, and the report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties, and under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change such as its assessment cycles and other findings.

177. The scope of this process is on reviewing all features of the collective quantified goal outlined in this decision (including quantity, quality, scope and access features, as well as sources of funding, of the goal and transparency arrangements to track progress towards achievement of the goal, without prejudice to other elements that will also be considered as the deliberations evolve), and to take appropriate measures regarding the review.

II. Process

178. This process shall commence at its session in 2033 and complete at its session in 2034 and be conducted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement with the assistance of:

(a) Option 1: the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, which will establish a joint contact group on the matter [with the secretariat to conduct at least two technical workshops to be conducted by the secretariat in 2024, with the participation of a diversity of stakeholders].

Option 2: a subsidiary body under the Paris Agreement, hereby established and known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance under the Paris Agreement [which shall meet at least four times in 2024].

179. This process shall be Party-driven with the participation of non-Party stakeholders and conducted in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, ensuring participatory representativeness.

180. Under this process, the achievement of the goal will be assessed taking into account the following, among other things:

(a) The degree to which the goal was met annually;

(b) The ratio of grant to highly concessional loans provided under the goal;

(c) The degree to which access was enhanced by developed country Parties and the respective channels in terms of the progress referred to in paragraph X of this decision;

(d) The degree to which the minimum allocation floors for LDC and SIDS were surpassed;

(e) The degree to which the transparency arrangements of the goal were adhered to

181. The assessment above shall take into consideration the need to consider information on progress using the following parameters, inter alia:

(a) Yearly achievement and cumulative achievement (i.e. over the timeframe);

(b) Aggregated and disaggregated amongst developing country regional groups of the United Nations, small island developing States, and least developed countries;

182. The process shall be informed by and take into consideration, inter alia:

(a) Inputs from Parties; constituted bodies, including their relevant outputs, in particular the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows and the report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement of the Standing Committee on Finance; international organisations and observers, as well as inputs received through relevant processes under the Paris Agreement, including on experience gained in implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

(b) The best available scientific information, including the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(c) Information from other relevant intergovernmental processes and insights from the business and research communities and from civil society;

(d) Information from Parties, particularly information related to the needs of developing countries;

(e) Other technical reports prepared by the secretariat and other independent organisations and observers;

III. Outcomes

183. The outcome of the process shall inform the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its session in 2034 in its deliberations, and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall conclude its deliberation by setting a new collective quantified goal in 2034 which reflect a progression beyond previous efforts.]